SWETT v. CUTTS.

The point is this: that though he has not. paid money for his
stock, yet as the corporate authorities chose to take his note in
lieu of the money, he thereby became a stockholder entitled to all
the rights of a stockholder, amongst which was the right of
refusing to go into a new enterprise, and though he refuses to-day
to go into the new enterprise, and calls for a dissolution, which is
granted, yet to-morrow, after the dissolution has taken place, he is.
as much liable to be called on for payment of his note as he ever
was, and the note though unpaid, will go into the general corporate
funds for distribution.
There is not in one of the cases, the slightest intimation that
the court thought the subscriber under an obligation to go into
the new enterprise. All that they decide is, that the stockholder
must pay up what he agreed to pay for his stock; after that, he
has the rights of all other stockholders, and may go into the new
enterprise, or call for a dissolution of his company, at his pleasure,
or, even before he pays up, he has the same right to call for a
dissolution, as, in theory, he has already paid for his stock when
the corporation compounded with him, and agreed to take his note
in lieu of money. Varying the form of statement: he subscribed
to stock to build a road from A. to B. Now having subscribed,
he is bound under any circumstances, to pay the subscription
price, unless the enterprise be abandoned. The road is built from
A. to B. Has he any right to refuse then to pay up on his subcription, when the very thing in regard to which he subscribed,
has been done? After the road is built the majority resolve to
extend it to C. Now, does making him pay up his subscription,
force him into being a stockholder in the new enterprise ? Unquestionably not. He is only required to pay what be promised
to pay in case the old enterprise should be undertakei, when he
may immediately insist that the old property shall be sold and
the proceeds divided, rather than he will go into the extension.
Wm. L. R'oYALLr.
RiCUMOND, Virginia.
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A landowner who in the reasonable use of his own land diverts or obstructs the
flow of water not gathered into a stream, but either circulating through the pores
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of the earth, or spreading over the surface in the season of melting snows or
heavy rains, is not liable for an injury to his neighbor caused by such diversion
or obstruction.
Where the plaintiff and defendant were adjoining owners of land by the side of
a highway, in the ditch of which water was accustomed to accumulate, and for
many years it found its way off through a depression in defendant's land: Held,
that plaintiff would acquire no right by prescription to have the water run off over
the defendant's land.

Tiiis was an action on the case for making an embankment by
the side of a highway, and causing the water which gathered there
to flow over the plaintiff's land.
It appeared on the trial that the plaintiff and defendant were
adjoining owners of land on the same side of a highway; that
in the season of melting snows and heavy rains, the water was
accustomed to accumulate in the ditch on the same side of the
highway; and the plaintiff's evidence tended to prove that for
more than forty years the water passed off through a depression
in the defendant's land, without seriously affecting the plaintiff's
land-and the injury complained of was the erection of an embankment by defendant at the low place on his land, by which
the water was diverted and turned upon the plaintiff's land.
The court instructed the jury that if the water so gathered had
been accustomed to run off over defendant's land for forty years,
and defendant had so diverted it, the action would be maintained;
to which the defendant excepted, and the jury having returned a
verdict for the plaintiff, defendant moved for a new trial for error
in these instructions.
JVait, for plaintiff.
Barton, for defendant.
BELLOWS, C. J.-In respect to water not gathered into a stream
but circulating through the pores of the earth, beneath its surface,
it is now settled that a landowner who in the reasonable use of
his own land, obstructs or diverts the flow of such water, even
to the injury of his neighbor's land, is not liable to respond in
damages.
This is not upon the principle that has been in some cases
adopted that the landowner has the absolute and unqualified property in all such water that may be found in his soil, and may
therefore do what he pleases with it, as with the sand and rock
that form part of that soil, but upon the same general principle
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that governs the use of water flowing on the surface in well-defined
streams or channels; that is, to make a reasonable use of it for
domestic, agricultural and manufacturing purposes-not trenching
however upon the similar right of others.
So in respect to water percolating through the soil, the landowner may ordinarily drain his land; may obstruct the ustial
course of the flow of such water by walls for cellars, and other
purposes, and may dig wells and use the water for domestic and
Sagricultural purposes.
The test is the reasonableness of the use or disposition of such
water; and ordinarily that is a question of fact for the jury under
the instructions of the court.
In favoi' of the unqualified and absolute right of the landowner
to dispose of all such water as he finds in his soil, or that he may
draw there by wells dug on his land, it is urged that he cannot
know the condition of the water beneath the surface; the changes
that take place or the sources of supply of the springs and wells
in the adjoining lands, or what portion is drawn from his own soil
and what was originally found in his neighbor's; and therefore
that there is no ground for presuming a mutual agreement between
the landowners in ages past in respect to such underground water,
or for holding a right to have been acquired by use or acquiescence. So is the leading case of Acton v. Blundell, 12 li. & W.
836.
In the first place we do not understand that the rights of the
riparian owner to the use of streams of water running upon the
surface are to be deduced from the presumed mutual agreement
or acquiescence of landowners; but rather as a natural right
incident to the land, to partake in the enjoyment of the common
bounty of Providence, as in the cases of light and air: -Dickinson
v. Canal Co., 7 Exch. 299; Shury v. Piggot, 3 Bulst. 339;
Ohassemore v. Richards, 2 H. & N. 168; Tyler v. Wilkinson, 4
Mason 397.
And, in the second place, although it may be true that in the
majority of cases the condition of the water-flow beneath the
surface is not accurately known, yet in a great many instances
its general course, from the slope of the surface, the appearance
of springs and other indications of water, is quite obvious.
Indeed this doctrine appears to embrace that large class of
cases where the water flows in sight upon the surface in wet sea-
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sons of the year, but not to such an extent as to mark a regular
channel with banks and sides. And also where the water moves
slowly, but obviously, through boggy or swampy lands, constituting the sources of streams and rivers.
The doctrine in fact would justify a landowner in intercepting
and diverting the water so working its way through spongy or
swampy land at any point before it was gathered into a regular
channel; although it might be obvious that such water was the
source of a stream which furnished valuable mill-sites; even
although such diversion was in no way necessary to the enjoyment
of his land.
The contrary doctrine in respect to water percolating beneath
the surface is established in this state in the well-considered case
of Basset v. SalsburyiXianuf. Co., 43 N. H. 569; s. 0. 3 Am. Law
Reg. N. S. 223. And the question is whether the doctrine of that
case applies to water which appears on the surface in the season of
melting snow and heavy rains, but is not gathered into any regular
channel or watercourse-or whether such water stands upon the
footing of permanent streams running upon the surface in regular
channels. If upon the latter footing, then the instructions were
sufficiently favorable to the defendant.
Upon the examination of the cases which maintain the doctrine
that the landowner may dispose of the water percolating beneath
his soil as he pleases, they will be found to include the case of
mere surface-water not gathered into streams.
In Rawstron v. Taylor, 11 Exch. Rep. 380, it is laid down
by PARKE, Baron, in the opinion of the court, that in the case of
common surface-water rising out of spongy or boggy ground,
and flowing in no definite channel, although contributing to the
supply of the plaintiff's mill, the supply being merely casual and
the water having no defined course, the defendant is entitled to
get rid of it as he pleases.
The same doctrine is announced in Broadbent v. Bamsbotham,
11 Exch. 602, which was an action for diyerting water on defendant's land, which naturally flowed over the surface of a hill
into a brook which supplied plaintiff's mill.
The court, per ALDERSON, Baron, says the right of the plaintiff
cannot extend further than the right to the flow in the brook
itself, and to the water flowing in some defined natural channel
either subterranean or on the surface communicating directly with
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the brook itself. No doubt, he says, all the water falling from
heaven and shed upon the surface of the hill, at the foot of which
a brook runs, must, by the natural force of gravity, find its way
to the bottom, and go into the brook; but this does not prevent
the owner of the land on which this water falls from dealing with
it as he may please, and appropriating it. He cannot, it is true,
do so if the water has arrived at, and is flowing, in some natural
channel already formed. But he has a perfect right to appropriate it before it arrives at such a channel.
It is quite clear that such surface-water is put upon the same
footing as water percolating beneath the surface, and the cases
are quite numerous that show it, and we think it should be so
upon principle.
The great objection to applying the doctrine which forbids the
diversion of running streams, to water circulating in the pores of
the earth, is that if apllied without *qualification it would to a
great extent prevent the beneficial enjoyment and improvement
of one's own land.
A similar effect, though less extensive, would be produced by
applying that doctrine to mere surface-water -not gathered into
any regular and defined channel. In many cases of spongy and
swampy lands the water moves from a higher to a lower level over
a wide space which under such a doctrine could not be drained or
reclaimed. So in case of rain falling upon the side of a hill, and
which would naturally find its way upon the surface into a brook
at the bottom, such a doctrine might effectually prevent theimprovement of very extensive tracts of land.
Again, the boundary line between what shall be deemed underground percolation and mere surface-water would often be extremely
difficult to define, and from that source serious embarrassments
might arise.
From the nature of the case, then, we think that the line is
properly drawn between water running in natural streams with
well defined channels, and that which is merely spread over the
surface and flows without any regular course or channel, or circulates under the surface through the pores of the earth.
The authorities are numerous to this point besides those already
cited; among them are 3 Kent's Com. 489 note 2, and cases; Ashley v. Wolcott, 11 Cush. 192, Luther v. Tinnisimmet Co., 9 Cush.
171; Theatly v. Baugh, 25 Penn. St. Rep. 528, Buffum v. Bar-

SWETT v. CUTTS.

ris, 5 R. I. 243 ; See also Ellis v. Duncan, 21 Barb. 230 ; Washburn on Easements 358, and cases cited.
These authorities, to be sure, hold generally that in respect to
mere surface and underground water not gathered into streams,
the landowner where it is found, has the unqualified right to dispose of it as he pleases, although in some cases the right appears
to be limited to cases where it is dealt with in the improvement of
such owner's land, and without malice, as in W-heatly v. Baugh,
25 Penn. St. Rep. 532.
But these cases concur in putting all water not gathered into
watercourses, whether upon the surface or underneath, on the
same footing, and so far we think they are right. As, however,
the case of Bassett v. Salsbury lManufacturing Company holds in
respect to water percolating through the soil that the landowner's
right to obstruct or divert it is limited to what is necessary in the
reasonable use of his own land, we think the same rule must be
applied to mere surface-water not gathered into a stream.
To give the landowner the absolute and unqualified right of
disposing of such water would in many instances be productive
of great mischiefs to his neighbors, and lead to interminable
struggles between them; for the same power to deal with such
water would exist in each landowner when it was on his land.
In many instances the water would assume so much of the
character of a natural watercourse as to make the application of
such a doctrine odious and unjust-while at the same time a total
want of power to modify such flow to meet the necessities of thelandowner, would often stand in the way of valuable improvements
which might be made without serious detriment to any one.
The doctrine which we maintain adapts itself to the ever-varying
circumstances of each particular case; from that which makes a
near approach to a natural watercourse down, by imperceptible
gradations, to the case of mere percolation, giving to each landowner while in the reasonable use and improvement of his land
the right to make reasonable modifications of the flow of such
water in and upon his land.
In determining this question all the circumstances of the case
would of course be considered; and among them the nature and
importance of the improvements sought to be made, the extent
of the interference with the water, and the amount of injury done
to the other landowners, as compared with the value of such im-

SWETT v. CUTTS.

provements. And also whether such injury could, or could not,
have been reasonably foreseen.
Ordinarily a landowner may dig a well upon his own land, even
though by.percolation it draws the water from his neighbor's land,
or even his well; but it would present a very different question if
thb well was dug by him with the express purpose of transferring
the water in his neighbor's spring or well to his own, and knowing
that this would be the result.
So, too, the owner of extensive swamp lands which are the
source of a river furnishing valuable mill-sites, might reasonably
be allowed to drain it by bringing the water into one channel,
when it might be regarded as unreasonable to divert it entirely
from its natural course.
So, also, excavations maliciously made in one s own land with a
view to destroy a spring or well in his neighbor's land could not
be regarded as reasonable; and there would be much ground for
holding that if the spring or well in his neighbor's land could be
preserved without material detriment to the landowner making
such excavations, it would be evidence of malice or such negligence
as to be equivalent to malice: Wheatly v. Baugh, 25 Penn. St.
'Rep. 532.
In the case before us the instructions asked for by the defendant assumed that he had the absolute and unqualified right to dispose of this water as he pleased, while the instructions given assumed that if the state of things proved, had existed from time
beyond memory, the defendant had no right at all to stop the flow
of this water over his land and thus cause it to flow over the
plaintiff's land.
If this was mere surface-water not gathered into a watercourse,
as we should infer it was from the case, the instructions upon the
principles we have stated are erroneous, unless the plaintiff had
acquired a right by prescription to Hfave the water flow over the
defendant's land.
On that point, to constitute a title by prescription there must
have been an adverse user under a claim of right for twenty years
or more; but here there has been no such user, the defendant has
merely permitted the surface-water casually on his land to flow off
over it. It does not appear that the plaintiff has claimed or exercised a right to discharge the water on his land upon the defendant's land, or that he has ever done any act or put himself in a
VoL. XX.-2
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situation, by reason of which the defendant could maintain a suit
against him, and thus interrupt a process of gaining title by prescription. It is true that some water which had gathered on the
plaintiff's land may have passed off in the same way over the
defendant's land, but if it did, it was by no act of the plaintiff,
nor under any claim of right by him.
So the fact that this water had passed over defendant's land for
more than twenty years does not change its character and make
it a watercourse.
In Wood v. Maud, 3 Exch. 778, the court holds that the
right to watercourses arising from enjoyment is not the same in
respect to natural and artificialwatercourses; holding that as to
the latter the right must depend upon their character, whether
of a permanent or temporary nature, and upon the circumstances
under which they are created. And by way- of illustration say,
that the flow of water from a drain for the purpose of agricultural
improvements for twenty years could not give a right to a neighbor
so as to preclude the proprietor from altering the level of his drains
for the greater improvement of his land.
This precise case arose in areatrix v. Hayward, 8 Exch. Rep.
291, and was settled in accordance with this doctrine of Wood v.
Waud.
The same doctrine was applied in the cases of drains for mining
purposes, in Arcright v. Bell, 5 M. & W. 203.
In these cases, from the temporary nature of such drains and
artificial watercourses, is deduced the inference that the use of
the water discharged by them could. not have been enjoyed as
matter of right; See Wood v. Waud, 3 Exch. 778.
In the subsequent case of Rawstron v. Taylor, 11 Exch. 369,
surface-water on defendaAt's land for more than twenty years had
flowed over land of the plaintiff into his watercourse, and he had
used it; but it was held that plaintiff could maintain no action
against defendant for diverting it on his own" land.
In respect to water percolating beneath the surface the tendency
of the authorities is against acquiring a right by prescription.
The use of such water upon one's own land is apparently rightful,
and is no such invasion of the rights of the adjoining owner as
would enable him to maintain a suit: for it would be impossible
to know that he was drawing water from his neighbor's land:
Washburn on Easements 384-390 and cases cited. In this respect
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water that comes to the surface stands on a different footing, and
yet in general they are governed by the same rules.
There may, doubtless, be cases where rights may be acquired
liy user in respect to such surface-water, as in the case of eaves'
drip, but it can be only where the use is adverse and such as to
give notice to the party against whom the right is acquired. In
the case before us, however, no right of the defendant was invaded
by any act of the plaintiff, ie simply permitted the water
gathered by the road-side to flow over his land, and so long as he
did so, he could maintain no action against any one; and we think
the plaintiff had gained no right by prescription to have this water
flow over the defendant's land, and there must be a new trial.
We think the foregoing very able
opinion must commend itself to our
readers. The early and leading case
of Acton v. .Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324,
holds that the owner of land, through
which water flows in a subterranean
course, has no right or interest in it
which will enable him to maintain an
action against an adjoining landowner,
who, in carrying on mining operations,
in his own land, in the usual manner,
drains away such water and leaves a
well dry. There is here some query expressed whether the case would be the
same, if the well had been an. ancient
one. But the later cases have not sustained this doubt. All wells on a man's
own land are legal, and none the more
so for being ancient. And the owner
of such well acquires no rights, by prescription, against-the owner of the adjoining land, whose springs contribute
to supply the wafer by which the well is
fed, unless it come frons well-defined
channels upon the surface or so near the
surface as to be well known and clearly
understood.
To create a right in one owner of
land, against an adjoining landowner,
to the use of water coming from his
land, there must be something more
than a mere surface drainage over the
entire face of the land occasioned by
unusual freshets, or other extraordinary

causes : Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 9
Cush. 171. There must be a "regular," well-defined "channel," "with
banks or sides:"

BIGELOW, J., in

Ashley/v. Wolcott, 11 Cush. 192, 195. It
is not essential that it should be a constantly flowing stream, but it must be a
stream, or water flowing in a channel,
or over a bed, which, if dry at some
seasons, gives unmistakable evidence
that the water Will return to its accustomed course, in the ordinary course of
the seasons: Id. ; Shields v. Arndt, 3
Green's Ch. 234, 246. The passage of
water from rain, or melting snow, over
the surface of land for twenty years,
gives no right to its continuance: Parks
v. Newbur~yport, 10 Gray 29. The principle involved, and indeed the facts in
the case last cited, resemble very closely
those in -the principal case. Here the
surface-water, in times of extraordinary
rains, and the melting of the snow in
the spring of the year, was accustomed
to pass-off from the plaintiff's land,
over the defendant's land, until the latter, having occasion to erect an enginehouse upon his land, had, by filling in
the dirt around the same, hindered the
former free flow of the water across his
land. And the same principles are
fully recognised in Dickinsonv. Worcester, 7 Allen 19, 20, by BIGELOW, C. J.

The learned judge here says: "A co-
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terminous proprietor may change the and thus involves an acquiescence on
situation, or surface of his land, by his part: Greenlef v. Francis, 18 Pick.
raising or filling it to a higher grade, 117. But this case assumes that the
by the construction of dikes, the erec- party shall act in godd faith and not
tion of structures, or by other improve- from a malicious intent to injure his
ments which cause water to accumulate neighbor, as some of the cases seem to
from natural causes, on adjacent land, justify: Chatfield v. Wilson, 28 Vt. 49.
In cases of mere adverse user it reand prevent it from passing off over the
quires the full period of the Statute of
surface."
There seems to be nothing very defi- Limitation as to lands, to perfect the
nite in the civil-law writers upon this prescriptive right. But there are cases
particular point except, that it is fully where the party acts in ignorance of
agreed in the body of the Roman law any counter claim, and the adverse
(Dig. lib. 89, tit. iii. s. 12), that if one party knowing of his own right being
by digging on his own land, in good thereby infringed, keeps silent and alfaith, and with no purpose of injuring lows the other party to expend money in
his neighbor, nevertheless dry up his creating erections which he would not
well by diverting the underground cur- have made if informed of the claim of
rents from it; there is no remedy by ac- the adverse party, where the law imposes
tion. "Mfarcellus scribit, cum eo, qui an estoppel at once upon the party thus
in suo fodiens, vicini fontem avertit, ni- disguising his claim, and thereby mishil posse agi, nec de dolo actionem; et leading his adversary: Gray v. Barrett,
sane non debet habere; si non animo 20 Pick. 186 ; where the point is well
vicino nocendi, sed snum agrum melio- presented by SHAW, C. J. The general
But the distinc- rule of law, that the owner of land can
rem faciendiid fecit."
tion between surface-water, accumulat- have no action against an adjoining
ing in low places from the melting proprietor, for carrying on such operaof snows in the spring, and that which tions upon his own land as he deems for
had formed more or less permanent his advantage, although he thereby
channels in the earth in its passage, drain the well or the surface-springs
would not be likely to attract the atten- upon the land of the other party, is well
tion of writers in most of the European
countries, and especially in Italy, where
no snows ever cover the ground.
The cases all agree that one by digging a well and using it, or using a surface-spring upon his own land, for ever
so long a time, acquires no easement in
or servitude upon the land adjoining,
and from which the supply of the well
or the surface-spring may come. And
this rests upon very obvious grounds,
viz., that the owner of the adjoining
land cannot, from the nature of the case,
know or understand, that the supply of
water is derived from his land;, and
no rights can be acquired by mere
use, unless it is adverse to the party
against whom such rights are claimed,

illustrated in the leading case of Acton
v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324. The argument in this case and the opinion of
Lord Chief Justice TiNDAL, give a most

satisfactory view of the law upon this
point, from that date backwards to the
times of the civil-law writers. And the
more recent decisions, which are very
numerous, have not essentially qualified
the rule here laid down. See Roath v.
Driscoll, 20 Conn. 533.
There is a very recent decision in the
Queen's Bench (July 1871), Mason v.
Ve Shrewsbury 4-Hereford Railway Co.,
20 W. R. 14, in which the Lord Chief
Justice COCKBURN and Justice BaACKBUR give separate opinions, where another point in the law affecting water-
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rights is thoroughly discussed, viz.,
How far a landowner acquires a prescriptive right to the continuance of running water, which is produced by the
diversion of a perennial stream for some
temporary purpose ; but which had been
continued in its new channel for a very
long period, about sixty years. It is
here held, that where water is allowed
to be diverted from its natural course by
parliamentary powers, in order to support the grant of a canal, and thus
thrown upon the land of others and the
former bed of the stream left dry,
whereby it is gradually filled up, so
that when the canal is converted into,
or discontinued by reason of, a railway
being constructed along the line, and the
stream restored to its former channel,
the land across which it flows is flooded
in time of high water, in consequence
of the channel having thus gradually
filled up by disuse, that the landowner
w ho thus suffers has no legal remedy.
This question is extensively considered
by POLLOCK, C. B., in the leading case
of Wood v. Wad, 3 Exch. 748, where
it was held, that a mill-owner who had
made extensive and valuable erections
upon a stream fed largely from the artificial drainage of mining lands, could
maintain no action against those who by
buildiug a more extensive drain, in another direction, had diverted the water
from the former drain, and thus rendered
the mill useless. The learned judge illustrates the subject very extensively by
reference to numerous cases of artificial
drainage, and concludes that the continuance of such drainage by these artifiial means and for obviously temporary
objects, gives the landowners below no
right to make erections depending upon
the permanency of the flow of water
produced by such artificial means and
for temporary purposes. It would seem
from The Nrational G. 21. Co. v. Donald,
7 W. R. 185, that in all cases of the diversion of a natural stream, under par-

liamentary powers, in the creation of
public works, that when the works are
discontinued, or the necessity for the
diversion ceases, the landowners from
whom the stream is thus diverted have
the right to insist upon its restoration to its former course. But it seems
to be questioned in the case last cited, %
whether a public company possess any
such functions or powers that their acquiescence in the use of the water in a
particular mode by others could give any
rights beyond the continuance, or except as against the company.
It will not be of interest probably
here, to go more into detail upon this
subject except to refer to some of the
later cases. The earlier cases will be
found digested in admirable system and
great thoroughness in Mr. Perkins's
late edition of Angell on Watercourses.
The precise point, so thoroughly and
ably discussed in the principal case, respects mainly surface-water, where there
is no clearly-defined channel for its
escape. For the fact that water at one
particular season in the year during the
melting of the snow in spring, and at
one particular point in the artificial
drain by the side of the highway, had
been accustomed to spread out upon the
defendant's land for more than twenty
years, and thus soak into the soil, could
not be regarded as thereby creating a
prescriptive right in all adjoining proprietors to have it continued, or even
to have created such a right, on behalf of the public authority, because
this is merely the diffusion of surfacewater, in a particular manner or in a
particular direction. And no rule of
law seems to be better settled, as we
have before shown, than that it is the
right of every landowner, to change
the diffusion of surface-water at his will
and pleasure, provided it be done in
good faith, in the enjoyment, and for the
greater usefulness of his own land. It
seems to have been held, in some cases,
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Gillet v. Johnson, 30 Conn. 180, not indispensable to the existence of a watercourse, that the banks and clearly-defined bed of the same should be discernible throughout its whole course.- In
the last case, where a watercourse, in
passing over low, flat lands, spread
itself out, so as not to break the surface
of the ground, it was nevertheless regarded as still retaining its character of
a watercourse. But in the principal
case there seems to have been nothing
of this character in the mere overflow
of the drain by the temporary increase
of the water and its consequent diffusion
upon the adjoining field.
The rules of law as to the rights of.
landowners in reference to surface-water, are clearly and justly stated by
BEASLEY, C. J., in Bowlsby v. peers,
2 Vroom 351. "There is," said the
learned judge, "no such thing known
to the law, as a right to any particular
flow of surface-water jure naturce. The
owner of land may, at his pleasure,
withhold the water falling on his property from passing in its natural course
on to that of his neighbor, and in the
same manner may prevent the water
falling on the land of the latter from
coming on to his own." The right to
discharge, or to receive the surface-water, can have no legal existence, except
from a grant express or implied. The
point decided in this case was, that it
was not actionable in the defendant to
obstruct, by means of necessary erections upon his own land, the free discharge of surface-water coming from
the plaintiff's land, and thereby causing
it to flow back upon and damage the
plaintiff's land. This must be regarded
as dannuma absque injuria. And the fact
that some portion of this water comes,
in times of freshet and extraordinary
rains or melting snows, from a natural
basin, where the surface-water accumulates and sometimes overflows, will
make no difference. But one level-

owner cannot justify draining his surface-water, at a particular point, upon
the land of his neighbor, in order to
render his own land more useful: Butler v. Pec, 16 Ohio N. S. 334; Miller
v. Laubac4, 47 Penna. 154. But in the
latter case it was held the landowner
may drain the excess of surface-water
from his own land into a stream running through it, without exposing himself to an action at the suit of the proprietors below. This general subject is
ably discussed by COLT, J., in Wheeler
v. City of !Worcester, 10 .Alien 591, in
regard to the responsibility resulting
from the erection and continuance of
public works, along and across natural
streams of water, consequent upon the
changing currents and varying points
of the discharge of surface-water into
such streams. And railways are not at
liberty to drain off from their tracks an
excess of surface-water produced by excavating for their road-bed and thus
opening up underground springs, and
throw the same upon the land of adjoining proprietors not embraced in the land
condemned for the use of the road,
unless such act becomes absolutely necessary for the continued operation of
the road, and in such case it must be
done in a manner least injurious to the
adjoining proprietors: Curtis v. The
Eastern Rail'way Co., 14 Allen 55. In
Goodale v. Tuttle, 29 N. Y. 459, DEzuo,
Ch. J., said': "IIn respect to the running off of surface-water caused by rain
or snow, there is no principle which
will prevent the owner of land from filling up the wet and swampy places on
his own soil for its amelioration and its
own advantage, because his neighbor's
laud is so situated as to be incommoded
by it."
This well settled doctrine of the right
of the landowner to guard his soil
against the damaging effects of surfacewater flowing from his neighbor's land,
even at the expense of damaging his
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neighbor's laud by throwing the surface- - other, or when it can be done by drains
water back upon it, is somewhht severely * emptying into a natural stream and
condemned by BREESE, Ch. J., in Gil-- watercourse, there can be no doubt of
ham v. Madison County Railroad Com. his right thus to drain, even though the
pany, 49 11. 484, where the learned judge effect may be to increase the volume of
thus characterizes the rule of law main-- water unusually, at one season of the
tained in the principal case: Ic The doc- - year, or to diminish the supply at antrine of these cases wholly ignores that other." "No one can be required to
most favored and valuable maxim of the suffer his land to be used as a reservoir
law, Sic utere tuo ut alienum non lwdas, a or water-table for the convenience or
maxim lying at the very foundation of advantage of others." This principle
good morals and so preservative of the is laid down by all the judges in Rawspeace of society." But that estimable tron v. Taylor, 11 Exch. 269 ; in Goodman and wise magistrate, as well as ale v. Tuttle, supra; and in Miller v.
learned and accomplished jurist, will be Laubach, supra.
as ready as any one, we doubt not, to
There seems to be no ground to quesrecognise the counter maxim of the law, tion the right of landowners to drain
that in the social state, we are all con- marshes and swamps upon their own
stantly exposed to innumerable losses, lands into streams running through them,
at the hands of others, where we have no and mill-owners upon the stream below,
redress, the loss being damnum absque in- who are damaged thereby, in two rejuria, and that the benevolent maxim of spects, 1st, by having the flow of water
the civil law to which he refers was never so increased, in times-of high water, that
intended to demand of any one to treat they cannot run their mills, by reason
his neighbor better than himself, or to of the excess of water ; and 2d, in having
f9 rego the use of his own property lest the stream fall below the quantity requihe might cause loss to others.
site to carry the mill, at a much earlier
The same rule in regard to surface- time in the season than it would otherwater, which we have before stated, wise do, have no cause of action, their
is very ably stated and maintained by loss being damnum absque injuria: Waffle
JoHxsoN, J., in Waffle v. N. Y. Central v. N. Y. Central Railroad Co., supra.
Railroad Co., 58 Barb. 413, where the In Beard v. Murphy, 37 Vt. 99, the
learned judge said-" Every person has right of the landowner to obstruct the
the unquestionable right to drain the flow of surface-water from the adjoining
surface-water from his own land to ren- land upon his own is placed upon someder it more wholesome, useful, or pro- what lower ground than most of the
ductive, or even to gratify his taste or other cases require, i. e. that it was renwill, and if another is inconvenienced, dered necessary to his own protection
or incidentally injured thereby, he can- against impurity which the adjoining
not complain. No one can divert a owner bad thrown into such surface-wanatural watercourse and stream through ter. The opinion of Mr. Justice Bmrhis land, to the injury of another, with NETT, in Chatfield v. Thilson, 28 Vt. 49,
impunity; nor can he by means of drains is pronounced by BALCO,,, J., in Trusor ditches, throw the surface-water from tees v. Yoemans, 50 Barb. 316, "1one of
his land upon the land of another, to the ablest opinions on the subject in the
the injtury of such other. But when a books ;" but as ive have had occasion to
person can drain his own land without say before, and in note to Basset v. Salturning the water upon the land of an- isbury Man. Co., 3 Am. Law Reg. N. S.
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223, 239, it pushes one point beyond the coming from underground springs, in
established rules of law, viz., the right any manner they may deem necessary
of the landowner to do acts upon his for the improvement or better enjoyment
land for the mere purpose of damaging of their own land, is most unquestionable. And if by so doing, in good faith
his neighbor.
We might pursue this inquiry much and with no purpose of abridging or
further, but having before given it some interfering with any of theirneighbor's
attention in another New HIampshire case, rights, they necessarily do damage to
Basset v. Salisbury Man. Co., supra, their neighbor's land, it must be regardwe forbear longer trespass upon the ed as no infringement of the maxim sic
It must be
patience of our readers.
tere tuo ut alienum non lesdas, but must
conceded, we think, that the right of be held damnum absque injuria.
landowners to deal with surface-water
I. F. R.
and all water mixed with the soil, or
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HENRY JANES v.EDWARD F. JENKINS.
The owner of two adjoining lots, which may be designated as the East and
West lots, leased the former for the renewable term of ninety-nine years, at a
certain yearly rent, and in the lease covenanted that the lessee should have the
right and privilege to make openings and place lights in the wall which he contemplated erecting on the western line of the property leased. The wall was
erected and openings were made and lights placed therein, which overlooked the
West lot. Subsequently the lessor conveyed the reversion in the East lot and
premises to the lessee thereof, in fee, and by this deed were granted with the lot
all buildings and improvements thereon erected, "and all and every the rights,
alleys, ways, waters, privileges, appurtenances, and advantages to the same belonging,
or in anywise appertaining." Afterward the owner of the West lot conveyed the
same, in fee, to a third party, the deed containing a covenant of special warranty.
On an action brought by the vendee of the West lot against the vendor for an
alleged breach of the covenant of special warranty, it was Held:
1st. That the conveyance to the vendee of the East !lot, passed the full right to
the free use and enjoyment of the lights in the wall as they then existed, as an
incident and appurtenance to the land conveyed ; and that such right as appurtenant to the premises will pass therewith to all successive owners of the property.
2d. That the vendee of the West lot took it with the servitude annexed for the
benefit of the East lot, and the existence of this servitude, and the enjoyment
thereof by the owner of the East lot, constituted no breach of the covenant of
special warranty.
Whenever an owner has created and annexed peculiar qualities and incidents
to different parts of his estate (and it matters not whether it be done by himself,
or his tenant by his authority), so that one portion of his land becomes visibly
dependent upon another for the supply or escape of water, or the supply of light
and air, or for means of access, or for beneficial use and occupation, and he grants
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the part to which such incidents are annexed, those incidents thus plainly attached
to the part granted, and to which another part is made servient, will pass to the
grantee as accessorial to the beneficial use and enjoyment of the land.
APPEAL from the Circuit Court for Baltimore County.
facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The

Arthur Geo. Brown and Geo. TVrm. Brown, for the appellant.
Arthiur T. Machen, for the appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ALV Ey, J.-The questions in this case arise upon a demurrer
to the declaration of the plaintiff below, who is the appellant in
this court. The action was one of covenant, brought on a supposed breach of a covenant of special warranty, contained in a
deed from the appellee to the appellant, dated the 29th of April
1867, for a house and lot on Monument street, in the city of
Baltimore.
It is shown by the declaration, that the appellee was owner in
fee of two adjoining lots, which may be designated- as East and
West lots, fronting on the south side of Monument street, and
that, on the 4th of May 1860, he leased the East lot to Joseph
W. Jenkins, for the renewable term of ninety-nine years, at the
clear yearly rent of $486; and in which lease was a covenant
that the lessee-should have the right and privilege to make openings and place lights in the wall which he contemplated erecting
on the western line of the property leased; such lights to be at
least five feet above any floor over which they might be opened.
The wall was erected, and-in pursuance of the privilege granted,
openings were made and lights placed therein, which overlooked
the West lot that was subsequently conveyed to the appellant.
After the erection of the wall, and placing therein the windows,
the appellee, by deed of the 29th of April 1863, conveyed the
reversion in the East lot and premises to Joseph W. Jenkins, in
fee, for the consideration of $8100, and all rent then in arrear.
By this deed, were granted with the lot all buildings and improvements thereon erected, made, or being, "and all and every the
rights, alleys, ways, waters, privileges, appurtena.nces,and advantages to t1he same belonging, or in anywise appertaining."
The covenant of special warranty contained in the deed of the
29th of April 1867, to the appellant, for the West lot, is to the
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effect that the appellee shall for ever warrant and defend the property, conveyed to the appellant, against the claims and demands
of the grantor, and all persons claiming by, through, or under
him. The breach alleged, is the existence of the windows in the
wall erected on the western line of the East lot, overlooking the
West lot conveyed to the appellant, "1whereby and in consequence
whereof the said plaintiff has been molested and hindered in, and
excluded from, the free and unobstructed use, possession, occupation, and enjoyment of the said property conveyed to him as
aforesaid, and said plaintiff, in consequence of the premises, has
likewise been, upon notice from said Joseph W. Jenkins, hindered
and prevented from building up to or near to the easternmost line
of his said property, and has also been prevented from selling or
disposing of the same for its proper value, in consequence of said
easement and encumbrance thereon."
Upon these allegations, being admitted by the demurrer, two
questions are presented: First, what passed to Joseph W. Jenkins,
the grantee of the Eastern lot and premises; and, secondly, if
the owner of that lot b6 entitled to the enjoyment of the lights
placed in the wall on the western boundary thereof, does the
covenant of special warranty afford the appellant, the owner of
the Western lot, a remedy in damages for the existence of such
an easement in his premises ?
1. As to the first of these questions, it must be observed that
the lights were placed in the wall at a time when the appellee was
owner of the reversion in the lot, and that it was done by his
express authority and agreement for a consideration. He could
not, therefore, during the continuance of the lease, and as owner
of the adjoining lot, interfere with or prevent the full and free
enjoyment of the easement thus created. But, by the subsequent
conveyance of the reversion, whereby the leasehold estate was
merged, did the right to this easement, or. quasi easement, cease
to exist? The lights were then in existence, and were used and
enjoyed as appurtenant to the Eastern lot, and had been placed in
the wall by the authority and under the grant of the appellant,
while he was owner of the reversion; this is not different, in
principle, from the cases of the owner of tWo adjoining heritages,
selling one, or of the owner of an entire heritage, selling and
granting part; in which the law would seem to be well settled,
that by the grant of the adjoining heritage, or part of an entire

JANES v. JENKINS.

heritage, there will pass to the grantee all such continuous and
apparent easements as may be, at the time of the grant, in use
for the beneficial enjoyment of the parcel granted; and this by
implication, unless words are used in the grant, manifesting an
intent to exclude them. Whenever, therefore, an owner has
created and annexed peculiar qualities and incidents 'to different
parts of his estate (and it matters not 'whether it be done by him-.
self, or his tenant by his authority), so that one portion of his
land becomes visibly dependent upon another for the supply or
escape of water, or the supply of light and air, or for means of
access, or for beneficial use and occupation, and he grants the
part to which such incidents are annexed, those incidents thus
plainly attached to the part granted, and to which another part
is made servient, will pass to the grantee, as accessorial to the
beneficial use and enjoyment of the land: Addison on Torts 80,
81; .Ewart v. Cochrane, 7 Jur. N. S. 925; Pyer v. Carter, 1 H.
& N. 916; Hall v. Lund, 1 H. & Colt. 676. And so the law is
explicitly announced, upon full review of the authorities, both
English and American, by the Court of Appeals of New York,
in the case of Lampman v. Milks, 21 N. Y. 505; it being there
decided, that wherever the owner of land has, by any artificial
arrangement, created an advantage or incident for the benefit of
one portion, to the burdening of the other, upon a severance of
the ownership, the holders of the two portions take them respectively charged with the servitude and entitled to the benefit openly
and visibly attached at the time of the conveyance of the portion
first granted. See also the case of United States v. Appleton, 1
Sumner 492, where the same principle is fully recognised and
adopted by Judge STORY.
Mr. Addison, in his very admirable work on the Law of Torts
90, has stated the law on this subject with great clearness and
precision. He says: " If the owner of a house and the surrounding land sells the house without the land, a free passage for so
much light and air as may be reasonably necessary for the beneficial occupation and enjoyment of the house is impliedly granted
by the vendor across his own adjoining unsold land, unless the
privilege is excluded by the express terms of the conveyance.
The vendor, therefore, cannot build on his own adjoining land so
as to obstruct the access of light and air to the windows of the
house. Having granted the house, he can do no act in derogation
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of his own grant. And if he sells and conveys the house to one
man, and the adjoining land to another, the purchaser of the adjoining land cannot build so as to darken or obstru.ct the windows
of the house, although such adjoining land may have been described as building-land, and the intention to build thereon may
have been "known to the purchaser at the time he purchased it."
The author refers to the cases of Palmer v. Fleteher,1 Lev. 122;
Canham v. Fisk, 2 Or. & J. 128, and Swansborough v. Coventry,
9 Bingham 305 ; to which he might have added the cases of Niciholas v. Chamberlain, Cro. Jac. 121; Bobbins v. Barnes,Hob. 131,
and Cox v. Matthews, 1 "entr. 237, as fully sustaining the principle stated by him.
And so, "where the shell of an unfinished house was sold,"
continues the same author, "with openings in the wall for the
insertion of windows and doors, it was held that the vendor could
not, after the sale and conveyance of the unfinished structure,
build on his own adjoining land, so as to obstruct the access of
light and air to the spaces left for windows, or place obstacles in
the way of the exercise of a right of way to the apertures intended for doors. And when two separate purchasers buy two
unfinished houses from the same vendor, and at the time of the
purchase the spaces for windows and doors are marked out, this
is a sufficient indication to the purchasers of the rights they are
respectively to enjoy; so that they cannot subsequently interfere
with each other's enjoyment of the windows and doors as marked
out and impliedly agreed upon at the time of the sale." Compton v. Bichards,1 Price 27; Wlave v. Harding, 27 Law J. Exch.
286.
In the case of _Ewart v. Cochrane, 7 Jur., N. S. 925, in the
House of Lords, where an owner of two adjoining properties conveyed them to different persons, and one of the properties had
enjoyed for a considerable time the privilege of a certain drain
into the other, and the drain having been: stopped by the owner
of the premises receiving the drainings, Ld. Chancellor CAMPBELL,
in delivering the leading opinion, said, "1I consider the law of
Scotland, as well as the law of England, to be, that when two
properties are possessed by the same owner, and there has been
a severance made of part from the other, anything which was
used, and was necessary for the comfortable enjoyment of that
part of the property which is granted, shall be considered to follow

JANES v. JENKINS.

29

from the grant if there be the usual words in the conveyance. I
do not know whether the usual words are essentially necessary,
but where there are the usual words I cannot doubt that that is
the law ;" and he refers to the case of Pyer v. Carter, 1 H. & N.
916.
In the case before us the grant not only contained the usual
words, but was explicit in granting the lot with all the rights,
privileges, appurtenances, and advantages thereto belonging, or in
anywise appertaining. It is clear, however, upon the authorities,
that no special terms in the conveyance are necessary, but, as was
said by the court in Bobbins v. Barnes, Hob. 131, the premises
"C
must be taken as they were at the time of the conveyance." See,
also, Thayer v. Payne, 2 Cush. 827.
The principle here asserted is well founded in the common law,
and has been recognised and impliedly approved by this Court in
the case of Cherry v. Stein, 11 Md. 1. In that case the English
doctrine in regard to ancient lights was rejected as being inapplicable here, because if adopted it would greatly interfere with and
impede the rapid changes and improvements constantly going on
in our cities and villages. That doctrine, however, while founded
in the presumption of grant, is evidenced and established by use
and time only. But not so in the case of a common proprietor
conveying two adjoining tenements to different persons, and the
first granted tenement is at the time in the full enjoyment of windows overlooking the other. In such case the question is what
passed by the grant or conveyance? The grantor being the owner
of both tenements, could, for the benefit of the tenement granted,
fix upon his remaining tenement any servitude he thought proper.
That being so, the relative rights and incidents of the two tenements must be taken as fixed at the time of severance by the first
grant; and, unless restrictive words are used, each will retain, as
between the two, all such incidents and easements as are then
openly and visibly attached to and used by it. And there is no
exception to this rule in regard to light and air; though the right
to light and air thus acquired is founded, as we have observed, in
very different principles from those upon which the rejected doctrine of ancient lights is founded. The distinction is most obvious.
We think, therefore, that it is plain, the conveyance to Joseph
W. Jenkins passed the full right to the free use and enjoyment of
the lights in the wall as they then existed, as an incident and ap-
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purtenance to the land conveyed; and as appurtenant to the premises such right will pass therewith to all successive owners of the
property. And as the grantor, after the conveyance, could not himself lawfully hinder or obstruct the light and air from those windows,
and thus derogate from the grant, it is clear he could not transfer
to the appellant any right to do so, and, :consequently, the latter
took the Western lot with the servitude annexed for the benefit of
the Eastern lot: Story v. Odin, 12 Mass. 157.
2. Then, as to the second question, whether the existence of
this servitude or burthen upon the property sold to the appellant,
and the enjoyment thereof by the owner of the Eastern lot, constitute a breach of the covenant of special warranty ? This
depends upon the apparent and ostensible condition of the property
at the time of sale. And as the wall had been erected, and the
lights therein were plainly to be seen when the appellant purchased
the property overlooked by them, it is but rational to conclude
that he contracted with reference to that condition of the property,
and that the price was regulated accordingly. The parties, in
the absence of anything to the contrary,' are presumed to have
contracted with reference to the then state and condition of the
property; and if an easement to which it is subject be open and
visible, and of a continuous character, the purchaser is supposed
to have been willing to take the property, as it was at the time,
subject to such burthen. That being so, the covenants in the
deed must likewise be construed with reference to the condition
of the property at the time of conveyance. The grantor, by his
covenant, warranted the premises as they were, and by no means
intended to warrant against an existing easement, which was open
and visible to the appellant, and over which the former had no
power or control whatever. To construe the covenant to embrace
such subject would most likely defeat the understanding and intention of the parties; certainly of the grantor: Washburn on Easements 68.
In the case of Pattersonv. Arthur, 9 Watts 154, the question
was whether an existing highway was an encumbrance, within the
meaning of the covenant against encumbrances on the land sold,
and the court said, "if there be a public road or highway, open
and in use upon it (the land sold),he (the purchaser) must be taken
to have seen it, and to have fixed, in his own mind, the price that
he was willing to give for the land, with a reference to the road,
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either making the price less or more as he considered the road to
be injurious or advantageous to the occupation and enjoyment of
the land ;" and it was considered that the covenant did not embrace such an encumbrance. So we think here, the covenant of
special warranty in the deed from the appellee to the appellant,
does not embrace the easement complained of. The judgment of
the Court below will therefore be affirmed.
We venture to express a doubt whether the ruling of the court upon the second point in the foregoing case, can be
supported upon principle.
As a general rule, the existence of
easements on the land conveyed is a
breach of a covenant against encumbrances.
"The covenant is broken by the existence of such easements as a paramount
right to dam up and use the water of a
,tream running through the land con-eyed, or of a right of way to a spring
tpon it, or to clean an artificial waterourse, or to cut timber, or to erect a
party-wall, and the like :" Rawle on
Covenants for Title 113, citing Morgan
v. Smith, I1 Ills. 199; Ginn v. Hancock, 31 Ale. 42; Ritch v. Seymour, 9
Met. 466; Ballard v. Ballard Vale Co.,
5 Gray 458 ;
itchell v. Warner, 5
Conn. 497 ; Harlow v. Thomas, 15 Pick.
68; Prescott v. Williams, 5 Met. 433;
Cathcart v. Bowman, 5 Barr 319.
The reasoning on which these cases
were decided would include also an
easement of ancient lights, and the only
reason why such a case is not to be found
in illustration of the rule, is that the
doctrine of ancient lights has been generally held to be inapplicable to this
country: Washburn on Easements 498,
et seq.
In the principal case the court say
that the question whether or not the existence of. this servitude on the laud
conveyed was a breach of the covenant
of warranty, "depends upon the apparent and ostensible condition of the property at the time of sale. And as the
wall had been erected, and the lights

therein were plainly to be seen when
the appellant purchased the property
overlooked by them, it is but rational to
conclude that he contracted with reference to that condition of the property,
and that the price was regulated accordingly. The parties, in the absence of
anything to the contrary, are presumed
to have contracted with reference to the
then state and condition of the property ;
and if an easement to which it is subject be open and visible, and of a continuous character, the purchaser is supposed to have been willing to take the
property, as it was at the time, subject
to such burthen. That being so, the
covenants in the deed must likewise be
construed with reference to the condition
of the property at the time of conveyance. The grantor, by his covenant,
warranted the premises as they were,
and by no means intended to warrant
against an existing easement, which was
open and visible to the appellant, and
over which the former had no power or
control whatever."
Now was this an "1existing easement
which was open and visible to the appellant?" Certainly not, unless the
mere fact of an open window looking
over my land is an open and visible
claim to an easement to have such window continue; unless it is in itself
notice of an easement whose extent I
am bound to ascertain at my peril. By
the English doctrine as.to ancient lights
a purchaser is put to this inquiry, but
the doctrine of ancient lights not being
in force in Maryland, had not the purchaser a right to rely on the general
presumption that thu open window would
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not prevent his building up a blank wall
against it ? The easement here was not
by virtue of a general rule as to windows and light, but of the exceptional
circumstance that the grantor of the
appellant had been also the grantor of
the adjoining landowner, and that the
dominant and servient tenements had
formerly been parts of one property.
If the two tenements had always been
distince and the title in different persons there is no claim that an easement

would have existed; to hold that it had
an ,1opqn and visible" existence in this
case is therefore to hold that a purchaser
must take notice at his peril of facts in
the chain of title not only to his own
but to his neighbors' land.
We venture to suggest that on principle it should have been held that as to
this purchaser this was a secret or latent
easement and its existence was a breach
of the grantor's covenant.
J. T. M.

Supreme Court of JKansas.
UNION PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY v. LLOYD NICHOLS.
The United States Express Company had the use of a portion of the baggage
car on a passenger train of the Union Pacific Railway Company, Eastern Division, and their travelling agents, called express messengers, were allowed to ride
on this car without paying fare. Other passengers were excluded therefrom.
IThe plaintiff by an arrangement with the express messenger and a local agent
of the express company at the state line, went into this car for the purpose of
learning the route so that he might take the express messenger's place in his
absence. The plaintiff was introduced to the conductor by the express messenger,
as an express messenger learning the route, and afterwards he acted as such,
assisting the regular express messenger along the route. The conductor allowed
him to ride in the baggage car without paying any fare. There was plenty of
room in the passenger cars for him. He was not in fact an express messenger,
nor was he in the employ of the express company in any manner whatever; the
express messenger and the agent at the state line not having any authority to
employ him in any capacity. The baggage car was turned over and the plaintiff
injured. Held, in an action by the plaintiff against the railway company, for
damages for such injuries, that the plaintiff was not a passenger, nor entitled to
the rights of a passenger.

THIS was an action by Nichols to recover for injuries alleged

to have been committed by the railway company. The petition of the plaintiff set forth that there was a contract between
the parties; that the defendant undertook to carry the plaintiff
as a passenger in a car used among other ithings for that purpose,

from the state line near Kansas City to and beyond Monument
Station, for a certain hire and reward, and that while so carrying
the said plaintiff the said injuries were caused through the negligence of the agents and servants of the defendant.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
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. P. Usher and MPfartin Burns &' Case, for plaintiff in error.
Clough & W-heat and T. P. Tenlon, for defendant in error.
VALENTINE, J.-The petition was not true, and there was no
evidence to sustain some of the most material portions of it. We
have all the evidence before us, and from that it unquestionably
appears that there was no contract entered into between the plain.
tiff and the railway company; the plaintiff was not a passenger
within the true legal signification of the term; he did not get into
or ride in any passenger car, and he did not pay or agree to pay
any hire or reward for his passage.
The only connection that the plaintiff had with the railway
company was as follows: He went on the train without purchasing any ticket, not into any passenger car, but into the baggage
car, and into that portion of.the baggage car which was used and
occupied exclusively by the United States Express Company for
their business, and remained there until he received the injuries
of which he now complains. When the conductor of the train
met him in the baggage car, he did not offer to pay his fare, but
allowed himself to be introduced to the conductor as an express
messenger. He was so introduced by Porter Warner, who had
been up to that time and then was, in fact, the regular express
messenger for that train. And Warner also represented to the
conductor that he "was learning the plaintiff the run." During
the trip the plaintiff acted as express messenger, having the keys,
and assisted Warner in handling and delivering the freight of theexpress company. The conductor, supposing the plaintiff to be
an express messenger, and therefore entitled to ride in the baggage car, and to ride free, or rather, supposing that his fare was
paid or arranged for by the express company in their contract
with the railway company, allowed him to ride in the baggage
car and collected no fare from him. The conductor made no contract with the plaintiff, but allowed him to ride on the contract
made between the plaintiff's supposed employer, the express company, and the conductor's employer, the railway company. The
conductor supposed that the plaintiff was riding in the baggage
car, and free, by authority as high as his own, and by an authority which he had no power to revoke. The conductor therefore
did not attempt to confer upon the plaintiff any right to ride upon
that train, but simply left the plaintiff with the right which he
VOL. XX.-3
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supposed the plaintiff already had, independent of any authority
from himself.
But the plaintiff had no such right, nor any right there. He
was not an express messenger, nor was he in the employ of the
express company in any manner whatever. He was there simply
by a private arrangement between himself and Warner and one
McNaughten, an agent of the express company at the state line,
"1for billing and transferring and delivering goods for the express
company." He was there simply learning the route, so that he
might be able to take the place of Warner during Warner's
absence. But he was not there by any authority of the express
company. Neither Warner or McNaughten or both together had
any authority to put him there. None but the president, vicepresident, or general superintendent of the express company had
any such authority. But the plaintiff did not even have the
authority or consent of the local superintendent of the express
company. Therefore he had no right whaever on said train.
Before proceeding further, perhaps, it would be proper to state
that the said baggage car ran off the track and was upset, about
three miles east of Monument Station, because of a "low joint"
in the rail, and injured the plaintiff and one or two others; that
"9none of the passenger coaches went off the track so as to injure
the coaches or any passengers ;" that there were only about
twenty passengers on the train during that trip, and that "there
was room in the passenger cars for some fifty or sixty more passengers than were on the train ;" that "1the rules of the company
prohibited passengers from riding in the express, mail, or baggage
cars;" that the plaintiff was so injured as to impair his mind;
and that the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court
was for $22,500.
Now, so far as the argument or the decision of this case is
concerned, it will be admitted that all the, rulings of the court
below were correct if the plaintiff had been a passenger within
the true sense of that term. Also, that a regular express messenger is a passenger entitled to receive the same care as any
other passenger, so far as the same can be exercised toward him,
although nothing be paid for-his transportation, except what the
express company pays to the railway company for transportation
generally of their freight and agents. Also, that any person
may be a passenger entitled to all the rights and privileges of
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other passengers without the payment of any fare, if he be on
the train with the consent of the company or its officers, provided
said consent be obtained without any fraud, or provided said company or its officers have a full knowledge of all the facts. Also,
that a regular passenger may be allowed by the conductor the
privilege of walking through the cars or getting on the platform
or into the baggage car without forfeiting aiy of his rights as a
passenger. And, also, that the obligations of common carriers
of passengers do not rest wholly or even mainly upon contract,
but principally upon the laws of the state in which such carriers
do busintss. But it will not be admitted that any and every
person who may enter a car or go upon a train is a passenger or
entitled to all the rights and privileges of a passenger.
The employees of the railway company are not passengers,
although they may do more riding upon the road than any other
class of persons. (See the numerous decisions concerning the.
liability of railroad companies for injuries done to their employees
through the negligence of other employees: 1 Redfield on Rail,ways 520 to 537, and cases there cited: Shearman and Redfield
on Negligence 101 to 127, chap. 6, and cases there cited.) A
person who enters the cars to see a friend safely seated is not a
passenger:. Lucas v. New Bedford and Taunton Railroad Co.,
6 Gray 64. A person who rides upon the engine of a train with
the consent of the engineer, but contrary to a rule of the company, of which he is informed, is not a passenger: Robertson v.
New York and Erie Railway Co., 22 Barb. 91. And generally
whenever a person goes upon a train or on any part of the train
without authority, he is not a passenger: Moss v. Johnson, 22
Ill. 633. It is probably true that the obligation of a common
carrier of persons does not rest wholly or even mainly upon contract, but still no person can become a passenger except by a
contract either express or implied. "A passenger is a person
who undertakes, with the consent of the carrier, to travel in the
conveyance provided by the latter, other than in the service of
the carrier as such :" Shearman and Redfield on Negligence 292,
sec. 262. It is true that whenever a person who desires to become
a passenger on a railroad, does all that the laiw and the rules of
the company require of him for that purpose, it will be presumed
that the company has given its consent, and that the requisita
contract has been made, for in such a case the company could not
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legally withhold its consent; but whenever it is shown that such
person has not done what is required of him, no contract will be
presumed. It will then devolve upon such person to show affirmatively that a contract has been made-to show affirmatively that
the consent of the company has been given.
In the present case the plaintiff did not do what was required
of him, in order thtt he might become a passenger; he did not
himself make a contract with the railroad company or any of its
agents; and he had no right to ride under the contract made
between the express company and the railway company. The
consent obtained from the conductor was the consent that an
express messenger imight ride in the baggage car, and without paying his fare. Such consent did not apply to the plaintiff. But
if it be said that the conductor applied to the plaintiff, then it
may be answered that it was so done under a misapprehension,
induced by the plaintiff himself, in allowing himself to be introduced to the conductor as an express messenger, and represented
to be such, when in truth and in fact he was not such. This was
a legal fraud upon the conductor and upon the railway company,
whatever may have been the intentions of the plaintiff.
There was but little conflict in the evidence in this case-none
upon the points we have been discussing. Therefore, whether
the plaintiff was a passenger or not was purely a question of law.
If he was a passenger, he was undoubtedly entitled to recover,
for the railway company was unquestionably guilty of some negligence in allowing the track of the railroad to get out of repair.
Whether he was a passenger or not seems to have been considered
by the court below, as resting almost exclusively upon the moral
intentions of the plaintiff. If the plaintiff honestly believed that
he did right in doing as he did, or if he honestly believed that
the circumstances of the case gave him the right to do as he did,
then, according to the view of the court below, he was a passenger. But on the other hand, if he knowingly practised a
fraud and deception upon the conductor whereby he was allowed
to ride in the baggage car without the payment of fare, he was
not a passenger. This theory seems to have run through the
whole charge of the court, and the whole case seems to have
turned upon it. The court below, therefore, erred in its charge,
in some of the instructions that it gave and in some of the instructions that it refused. We think, however, that it made no differ-
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ence how honest the plaintiff was, nor how he viewed the said
transaction in its moral aspect.
For the reason that the court erred in charging the jury, and
for the reason that there was no evidence to sustain some of the
material allegations of the petition, the court also erred in overruling the defendant's motion for a new trial.
The judgment is reversed and a new trial oidered.
KINGMAN,

C. J., concurred.

Untited Sktes Circuit Court.

BREWER,

J., did not sit.

Southern District of Georgia.

UNITED STATES v. STARK

ET AL.

The Confederate States never had any existence as a sovereign power. All
the laws of the United States were in force at all times and in all places within
the territory of the United States during the war, whether the places were within
the military lines of the Confederate forces or not.
The concession of belligerent rights did not recognise or confer any right on
the Confederate States to collect duties on imports at a port within their lines.
Therefore payment to a Confederate collector of the port of Savannah, of duties
on goods which ran the blockade, is no defciee to an action by the United States
for the duties under the revenue laws.
The principles of the decision in U. S. v. Hayward, 2 Gall. 486, and U. S.
v. Rice, 4 Wheat. 247, do n p apply to such a case. Those were cases where the
territory passed under the sovereignty of a foreign power during a public war.

THIS was'an action brought to recover the sum of $959.04, the
duties on a quantity of molasses, valued at $3996, imported by the
defendants into the port of Savannah on the 7th day of May
1861. The defendants pleaded the general issue, and payment of
the duties.
The case was submitted to the jury on the following agreed facts:
The goods were imported into the port of Savannah by the defendants at the time named in the declaration, and the amount
of duties was as stated in the declaration, and they had never
been paid to the United States. John Boston, United States
collector of customs at the port of Savannah, resigned his office
on January 31st 1861, and he was collector of customs for the
Confederate States at the port of Savannah at the time of the
importation of the goods mentioned in the declaration.
At that time the port of Savannah was in the paramount
forcible military possession of the Confederate authorities, and
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by such paramount military authority the United States government, both civil and military, was excluded.
The duties on said goods were paid to the collector of customs
of the Confederate government.
John D. Pope, United States District Attorney, for plaintiff.
Law, Lovell, and Falligant,for defendants.
WooDs, J., charged the jury as follows:-

By the Act of Congress of 80th of July, 1846, § 1 (9 Stat.
at Large, p. 42), it is provided that there shall be levied, collected,
and paid on goods, wares, and merchandise imported into the
United States from a foreign country the duties prescribed by
the act. The United States is therefore entitled to recover in
this action, unless the defendants present some valid reason why
they should be relieved from the payment of the duties on the
goods imported by them.
Defendants insist that the agreed facts and public history, of
which the court takes judicial notice, shows such a state of affairs
that at the time of the importation they were under no obligation
to pay duties to the United States. They say that the Confederate States, being a belligerent power at war with the United
States, and holding by military force territory captured from the
United States, acquired a sovereignty over such territory, and
during such occupancy allegiance within such territory was due
to the Confederate states-and they, and they only were entitled
to receive duties on imports, and that in effect the port of Savannah was not a port of the United States, but was a port of
the Confederate States.
In support of this view the cases of United States v. Hayward,
2 Gall. 486, and United States v. Bice, 4 Wheat. 247, are cited.
Both these cases were actions for the recovery of duties on goods
imported into Castine during the war of 1812 with Great Britain,
and after that place had been captured by and surrendered to
the British forces. The Circuit Court of the United States in
the first case, and the Supreme Court of the United States in
the other, held that the goods imported were not liable to pay
duties to the United States.
The ground upon which these decisions were based is stated by
the court in the case of United States v. Hayward, in these
words: "By the conquest and occupation of Castine, that terri-
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tory passed under the allegiance and sovereignty of the enemy.
The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was of
course suspended, and the laws of the United States could no
longer be rightfully enforced or be obligatory upon the inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. Castine,
therefore, could not strictly be deemed a port of the United
States, for its sovereignty no longer extended over the place."
So in The United States v. Bice, the Supreme Court of the
United States says: "Under the circumstances we are all of
opinion that the claim for duties cannot be sustained- By the
conquest and military occupation, the enemy acquired that firm
possession which enabled him to exercise the fullest rights of
sovereignty over that place.
"The sovereignty of the United States over the territory was
of course suspended, and the laws of the United States could no
longer be rightfully, enforced there, or be obligatory upon the
inhabitants who remained and submitted to the conquerors. By
the surrender, the inhabitants passed under a temporary allegiance to the British government, and were bound- by such laws,
and such only, as it chose to recognise and impose. From the
nature of the case no other laws could be obligatory upon them,
for where there is no protection or allegiance or sovereignty,
there can be no claim to obedience. Castine was therefore, during
this period, so far as respected our revenue laws, to be deemed a
foreign port."
It is clear, from the extract just quoted, that the decision in
those cases was placed on the ground that Great Britain had acquired the sovereignty of Castine, and that the inhabitants owed
the British government allegiance. If the Confederate States
were a sovereignty, and were entitled as against the United States
to the allegiance of the people living within the territory held by
them, then these cases are directly in point as supporting the defendant's views. But the Confederate States as a sovereign
power never had an existence. It was never recognised as
such by any department of the government of the United States,
or by any other nation on the globe. There never was a moment
when any human being owed it allegiance; .on the contrary,
allegiance was due to the United States and to their laws from
all the inhabitants of the territory held by the military power
of the Confederate States, and any violation of the laws of the
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United States was punishable by the authority of the United
States. The government of the United States might prosecute
for violation of its laws during the rebellion. It has assumed to
pardon those guilty of offences against its statutes, and a large
number of prominent citizens of the late insurgent states now
-hold the pardon of the President for offences against the laws of
the country, committed during the rebellion, within the territory
held by the military power of the Confederate States. Can we
say, then, that a rebellion which never had a government which
was recognised as such, was a sovereign, that it acquired sovereignty over territory held by force of its arms, and that the
people of the territory controlled by it owed allegiance to a government which never had an existence ? Clearly not.
That these views are the views of the Supreme Court of the
United States will appear from the adjudicated cases..
In Hickman v. Jones, 9 Wall. 200, Mr. Justice SwAYNE, speaking for the court, says: "The rebellion, out of which the war
grew, was without any legal sanction. In the eye of the law it
had the same properties as if it had beeh the insurrection of a
county or smaller municipal territory against the state to which
it belonged. The proportions and duration of the struggle did
not affect its character, nor was there a rebel government de facto
in such a sense as to give any legal efficacy to its acts. It was
not recognised by the national or any foreign government. It
did not for a moment displace the rightful government. That
government was always in existence in the regular discharge of its
functions, and constantly exercising all its military power to put
down the resistance to its authority in the insurrectionary states.
The union of the states for all the purposes of the Constitution
is as perfect and indissoluble as the union of the integral parts
of the states themselves."
Again in the case of The United States v. Keehles, 9 Wall.
86, Mr. Justice MILLER, as the organ of the court, says:"It certainly cannot be admitted for a moment that a statute
of the Confederate States, or the order of its postmaster-general,
could have any legal effect in making the payment to Clements
valid. The whole Confederate power must be regarded as a
usurpation of unlawful authority, incapable of passing any valid
laws, and certainly incapable of divesting, by an act of its Congress, or an order of one of its departments, any right of property of the United States."
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In Shortridge v. Macon, tried by Mr. Chief Justice CHASE, in
the Circuit Court for the District of North Carolina, he says:
" War levied against the United States by citizens of the Republic
under the pretended authority of the new state government of
North Carolina, or the new central government which assumed
the title of Confederate States, was treason against the United
States. * * On no occasion and by no act have the United
States ever renounced their constitutional jurisdiction over the
whole territory, or over all the citizens of the Republic, or conceded to citizens in arms against their country the character of
alien enemies or to their pretended government the character
generally of a de facto government. There is nothing in the
prize cases which gives countenance to the doctrine which counsel
endeavors to deduce from it, that the insurgent states, by the act
of rebellion and by levying war against the nation, became foreign
states, and their inhabitants alien enemies."
These cases show how broadly the case at bar differs from the
case of United States v. Hayward,and United States v. Rice, relied
on by counsel for defendants. Those cases were placed on the
ground that the inhabitants of Castine owed allegiance to the
sovereignty of Great Britain and obedience to her laws. The
Confederate States were not a sovereignty, its inhabitants did not
owe it allegiance, were not bound by its laws. On the contrary,
the authority of the United States extended over them at all
times. Their duty of allegiance and obedience to its laws was
continuous and unbroken.
All the laws of the United States, the act levying duties on
imports included, were in force at all times and in all places within
the territory of the United States, as much in Savannah as in
New York, and all the citizens of the United States, whether
within or without the insurrectionary districts, owed them obedience. If,as held by Mr. Chief Justice CHASE, the laws of the
United States against treason were in force over the inhabitants
of the insurgent states, clearly the revenue laws were also in
force.
But it is claimed for defendants that the Confederate States
were belligerents, and that belligerent occupation gave them the
right to revenues of the port or country occupied. We cannot
concur in this view. It is difficult to conceive of a more dangerous and pernicious doctrine. It would place in the hands of
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insurgents, to whom, out of humane motives, belligerent rights
had been conceded, those rights which are only accorded to a
sovereign power, and hold out the hope of plunder as a motive
and incentive to rebellion. The concession of belligerent rights
to insurgents does not render them any the les's insurgents. It
clothes them with no attributes of sovereignty, among the highest
of which is the right to levy taxes and imposts. It gave the
insurgents no more right to collect duties than the grantifig of
belligerent rights to the insurgent inhabitants of a county in the
state of Georgia would confer upon them the right to enforce
the collection of the taxes due the state.
This precise point was decided by Mr. Chief Justice CHAsE, in
Skortridge v. Jacon, already cited. He says, "there is nothing
in that opinion (the prize cases) which gives countenance to the
doctrine that the insurgent states, by the act of rebellion, and
by levying war against the nation, became foreign states, and
their inhabitants alien enemies. This proposition being denied,
it must result that in compelling debtors to pay receivers for the
support of the rebellion debts due to any citizen of the United
States, the insurgent authorities committed illegal violence by
which no obligation of debtors to creditors could be cancelled or
in any respect affected."
We cannot admit for a moment the claim which appears to be
set up by counsel for defendants, that by the concession of belligerent rights to the insurgents, the United States agreed to remit
the duties on goods imported into the insurgent territory, because
such goods were necessary for the support of the insurgents.
In other words, the right to import goods free of duty is not
a belligerent right.
It is also claimed for defendants that a blockade of the ports
of the insurgent districts having been declared by the President
of the United States in his proclamation of April 19th 1861,
the laws for collection of duties were suspended by the law of the
blockade.
We do not understand that the President has authority to suspend the laws of the United States, nor can we suppose that this
was the purpose of the proclamation of the blockade. The preamble recites, as one of the reasons for the blockade, the fact
that by reason of the insurrection, the laws of the United States
for the collection of the revenue could not be effectually executed
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in the states named, conformably to that provision of the Constitution which requires duties to be uniform throughout the United
States. One purpose of the blockade was, therefore, to secure
the uniform collection of duties.
The way not to accomplish this would be to -allow all vessels
which might succeed in eluding the blockade to discharge their
cargoes duty free. If we adopt the view of defendants, one'
great purpose for which the blockade was established would be
defeated.
The laws of the United States required all goods imported from
a foreign country to pay duties.
The President's proclamation closed certain ports. Can it be
claimed, with any fair show of reason, that because a vessel has
defied the proclamation and entered a blockaded port, that fact
relieves her cargo from the payment of duties ?
Our view, then, of this case is this: The law of Congress gives
the National Government a right to collect duties on all foreign
goods imported into any port of the United States. Notwith.
standing the rebellion, the authority and laws of the United
States extended over the insurgent territory; the port of Savannah
was at all times a port of the United States.
The Confederate States was not a sovereignty. The laws of
its Congress were absolute nullities. They had no right to collect
duties, to levy taxes, or in any way to exercise the functions of a
government. The people of the insurgent states were not bound
to obey their laws, so far as they attempted to interfere with the
rights of the United States, but on the contrary owed allegiance
to the United States and obedience to their laws. And it follows
that the United States are entitled to the duties on goods imported
into the insurgent districts during the rebellion.
Your duty will therefore be discharged by returning a verdict
for the plaintiff for the sum of $959.04 in gold, with interest
from the 7th day of May, 1861.
ERSKINE J., concurred in the charge.
Verdict in accordance with the charge.

HARRISON v. HARRISON.

Supreme Court of Mermont.
WILLIAM 0. HARRISON v. HENRY C. HARRISON.
The owner of a freehold has the right to repelintrusion by necessary force.
The defendant, the minor son of S., was directed by his father to see that no
one interfered with an aqueduct upon his father's premises, and, having learned
that the plaintiff, with whom his father had had trouble about the aqueduct, was
about to interfere with it, went to the boundary of the land where the aqueduct
was, and but a few feet from it, and found the plaintiff about to enter upon the
land, on his way to the aqueduct. The defendant forbade the plaintifFs entering
upon the land, the plaintiff persisted in doing so, and sprang over the fence in a
threatening manner. Held, that defendant might rightfully resist the further approach of the plaintiff, using no unnecessary force.
Where the plea to a declaration for assault andbattery is son assault demesne and
the replication de injuria, all the averments of the plea are put in issue; and if
the plaintiff made the first assault, he can recover only for the excess of force
used in the defence.
When a party is assaulted, the degree of force which he may employ in repelling the assault depends to some extent upon the known character of the assailant
-whether peaceable or quarrelsome.
The defendant offered to prove that "plaintiff was reported to be-and was in
fact-a quarrelsome man, with a violent and uncontrollable temper; and this was
known to the defendant at the time of the affray," which was excluded by the
court. Held, that this evidence should have been received.
TRESPASS for an assault and battery. Plea, the general issue
and notice of defence: 1st, son, assault demesne; 2d, that assault
was made in self-defence, and in the defence of his father's close
and an aqueduct therein, by his father's command.
The plaintiff's evidence tended to show that for several years
he had been interested as an owner in an aqueduct on the land of
defendant's father, that on the evening of April 21st 1869, as he
was going on to that land to see about the aqueduct, he found the
defendant on the land, near the boundary of it; that they had
some words about the aqueduct, and that the defendant forbade
the plaintiff's entering upon the land; that the plaintiff persisted
in going upon the land to the aqueduct, and got over the fence;
that as he got over, the defendant struck him several heavy blows,
that injured him severely.
The defendant's evidence tended to show that his father and
the plaintiff had had trouble about the aqueduct, and that his
father had forbidden the plaintiffs entering upon his land where
it was, and that his father had told him-the defendant-to
watch the aqueduct, and see that no one interfered with it; but
had given him no directions about keeping any one off from the
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land. That on the 21st of April 1869, he was a minor, and was
at home in the service of his father, and that the plaintiff knew of
these relations. That in the evening of that day he learned that
the plaintiff was about to do something to the aqueduct, and that
he went to the fence at the boundary of the land where the aqueduct was, and found the plaintiff about to enter upon the land,
on his way to the aqueduct; that he forbade the plaintiff's going
upon the land, but that plaintiff persisted in doing so, and sprang
over the fence and went towards the defendant in a threatening
manner; that he then struck the plaintiff several blows, and that
the blows were struck in necessary defence of himself, in necessary defence of the land, and in necessary defence of the aquediuct. And that it was about twenty-two and one-half feet from
where the plaintiff sprang over the fence to the aqueduct.
The defendant offered testimony of Charles Hitchcock, and several other witnesses, to prove that the plaintiff was generally reputed to be and was, in fact, a quarrelsome man, with a violent
and uncontrollable temper, and that this was known to the defendant at the time of the assault. The plaintiff objected to the admission of the testimony, and it was excluded by the court, to
which the defendant excepted.
The defendant requested the court to charge:1. That upon the facts shown, the plaintiff could not object
that he did not know that the defendant was acting for his father.
2. That upon the facts shown, the plaintiff is to be presumed
to have known that the defendant was acting for his father in
defence of the aqueduct.
3. That the defendant was in possession of the land, as against
the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had no right to enter upon the
land, with force, against the command of the defendant, and that
if he did so, the defendant was justified in opposing force by force
to prevent the entry.
4. That if an intruder should commit an assault upon a possessor, the possessor would be justified in wounding the assailant.
5. That upon the facts shown, the defendant had the right to
oppose the entry upon the land by the plaintiff, and to use as much
force as was necessary to expel him from it, without requesting
him to depart from it.
6. That though there must have been no wanton use of violence, or more than necessary force by the defendant, courts and
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juries cannot be precise in such cases in making boundaries and
limits of such force.
The court charged the jury that the plaintiff. was entitled to
recover unless the defendant had made out one or the other of
the defences set forth in his notice. That to sustain the first defence he must have made out that just before he did what he did
to the plaintiff, the plaintiff attempted to do violence to him, with
the intention to harm him, and that the plaintiff had the means
there with which to carry the intention into effect; and that the
defendant in what he did to the plaintiff did no more than was
necessary to defend himself against the plaintiff. That if it became necessary for him to meet force of the plaintiff, he might
meet it with force sufficient to repel it.
That as to second defence, the defendant had failed to show any
command by his father to defend the land, and, therefore, so far
as defence of land and aqueduct is concerned, it was to be confined to the aqueduct. That the defendant had a right to defend
the aqueduct as against the plaintiff, but had no right to use violence to the plaintiff, until the plaintiff knew, or had good reason
to know, that the defendant was defending the aqueduct for his
father; that if the plaintiff knew this, or had good reason to
know it, the defendant was not bound to tell him. That the defendant had no right to use force to protect the aqueduct, till the
plaintiff had attempted to interfere with it to do harm to it, and
then had no right to use any more force than was reasonably
necessary to meet the plaintiff's attempt. That the defendant
had no right to assault the plaintiff until the plaintiff had gone
so far in an attempt to interfere with the aqueduct as to make it
necessary for him to do so in order to protect it from harm; and
that then he would have had a right to do only what was reasonably necessary in view of what the plaintiff had then done.
That so far as the plaintiff and defendant were concerned, except as to the defence of the aqueduct, both were rightfully there.
That if the defendant failed to make out either of the defences,
he was liable, and the verdict should be for the plaintiff.
That if the defendant was liable, he was liable for all the damage done by him to the plaintiff on that occasion, and the right
of the plaintiff to recover was not limited to the excess, even if
the plaintiff did make the first assault.
The court refused to charge as requested, except as the charge
detailed complies with the request.
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.Dunton & Veazey, for the defendant.
.Edgerton& Nicholson and C. H. Joyce, for the plaintiff.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
REDFIELD, J.-The case shows that the defendant's father was
the owner of the freehold on which was situate the aqueduct. The
father "had forbidden the plaintiff's entering on the land where
it was," and "had directed the defendant to watch the aqueduct
and see that no one interfered with it." The defendant was a
ninor son, in the service of his father, on the premises. The defendant went to the boundary of the land where the aqueduct was,
and found the plaintiff about to enter upon the land, on his way
to the aqueduct, and about 22J feet from it. Defendant forbade
the plaintiff's going upon the land, but he persisted and sprang
over the fence, and approached the defendant in a threatening
manner, and the defendant thereupon struck him several blows,
which he claimed were " in necessary defence of himself, the land,
and the aqueduct." The court charged the jury that "the defendant had no right to use force to protect the aqueduct till the
plaintiff had attempted to interfere with it to do harm to it;"
"that except as to the aqueduct both were rightfully there."
If the plaintiff had no right to interfere with the aqueduct, we
are unable to discover how he could be rightfully on the premises,
making his way towards the aqueduct, forcibly and against the
warning and protest of the defendant. The defendant, in the
defence of the aqueduct, was in the right. The plaintiff, persisting in his approach to the aqueduct, against the will of the defendant, was wholly in the wrong. The relative position of the parties
is important in determining their rights.
The defendant, in his defence of the aqueduct, was not bound
to wait until the plaintiff had reached it and was in the act of
dealing a destructive blow. He could rightfully defend the apprbaches and outposts. . If the plaintiff was within a few feet of
the aqueduct, and 1 on his way to it," the defendant, after warning him to desist, might as well resist his further approach, as to'
wait until injury or destruction became more imminent. If a servant be directed to defend a house or barn, he is not necessarily
confined to the lintel of the door, but may resist the intruder in
his approach,-in the yard, or at the gate. It would be too narrow to strip him of his justification because his resistance, other-
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wise justifiable, was made a few feet from the door. So in this
case, if the plaintiff forcibly persisted in going to the aqueduct
after be was forbidden to do so, the defendant might rightfully
resist his further approach, using no unnecessary force. And in
the charge of the court, in this respect, there was error.
II. The court charged the jury that the "plaintiff was not
limited to the excess even if the plaintiff did make the first assault." We think this was error. The rule has been well settled
in this state, though otherwise in the English practice, that when
de injuria is replied to the plea of son assaultdemesne, all the
substantial averments of the plea are put in issue; as well whether
more than necessary force was used in repelling the assault, as
who made the first assault; and if the plaintiff is shown to have
made the first assault, he can recover only for the excess of force
used in the defence: -Elliottv. Kilborn, 2 Verm. 470; Yale v.
Seely, 15 Id. 221; .Devine v. Band, 88 Id. 621. See also -Dole
v. .Erskline, 85 N H., 503.
We think this rule well founded in reason, and that the practice
in England, requiring, the plaintiff to new assign if he would go
for the excess, is too artificial, and needless; for the plea avers
that the defendant "used no unnecessary force," which the replication denies and puts in issue, and there would seem no reason
that the pleadings be further prolonged.
III. The defendant offered to prove that "plaintiff was reputed
to be, and was in fact, a quarrelsome man, with a violent and
uncontrollable temper, and this was known to the defendant at
the time;" which was excluded by the court. The defendant
must be judged, and justified or condemned, in the light of the
circumstances that surrounded him; not by the secret motive or
intent of the plaintiff, but by the apparent purpose; not by the
actual, but apparentdanger. If a man presents a pistol to another and threatens his life, the assailed party is not required to.
wait till he is shot, to test the certainty that the man intended to
kill him, but he would be justified in disabling his assailant at
once, though it should finally prove that the pistol was unloaded
and murder not intended. So if the assailant is known to the
assailed to be a practised pugilist and a man of violence, the kind
and degree of resistance must be measured, or at least modified,
by the apparent danger with which the party is threatened. And
we think that, when the "plaintiff sprang over the fence and went

